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DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

DRL § 211:

Cooling-off period does not apply to counterclaim for
separation in an annulment action.

Under the new Section 211 of the DRL,'5 3 a complaint in any
action for a divorce or separation cannot be served until the
expiration of a 120 day "cooling-off" period or, in the case of a
divorce action, at the expiration of conciliation proceedings, which-

ever period is less. 54 In Botti v. Botti, 5 5 the husband brought an
action for an annulment and the wife counterclaimed for a separation. The court rejected the husband's contention that the counterclaim was a violation of section 211 and allowed the wife's counterclaim without requiring the statutory cooling-off period. The court
reasoned that section 211, by its language, applied only to divorce
and separation actions and had no application in a suit for annulment. It was concluded that since the new section contained no
prohibition against entering a counterclaim, it should be allowed
under CPLR 3011 and 3019(a) and under "the liberal and expanding practice in claims between litigants to avoid multiplicity
and circuity of actions." 156 The court directed that the husband's
action for annulment be tried first and upon an unfavorable determination of that action, that the wife's claim be adjudicated.
It may be argued that the court's decision is inconsistent with
the intent of the legislature in providing for the cooling-off period.
However, it can be fairly said that in a situation such as this,
there is little hope of saving the marriage and a cooling-off period
or conciliation proceedings would be futile. In any event, the language of the statute appears to justify the conclusion of the court,
and if the legislature did not intend such a result, an amendment
would seem to be in order.
DRL § 211:

Amendment of complaint for separation to include
action for divorce allowed.

In another case involving an interpretation of Section
the DRL 5 7 the husband moved to amend his complaint in
ration action so as to demand a divorce upon the same
allegations.'
The question arose as to whether such an
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ment was permissible in view of the requirement of section 211
that "an action for divorce or separation shall be commenced by
the service of a summons" and the requirement of section 215-c(a)
that within 10 days after the commencement of an action for
divorce the plaintiff shall commence conciliation proceedings. The
court allowed the amendment concluding that the requirements of
the new law could be met without the service of a separate summons and the institution of a new action. The action for divorce
was deemed to have been commenced by order of the court and
the plaintiff was directed to serve his amended complaint at the
end of 120 days or the expiration of conciliation proceedings,
whichever came first.
The court referred to a conflict which existed within the second department as to whether a pleading in a separation action
could be amended in light of the new law. The two cases cited
by the court to illustrate the conflict, however, can be reconciled.
In Saunders v. Saunders, 59 the plaintiff moved to amend her
complaint on the condition that she would not be compelled to
proceed to conciliation as required by section 215-c, whereas in
Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick 10 where the amendment was granted, no
such limitation was requested.
While the court in Saunders refused to extend its opinion
beyond the facts of that case, it appears that a court can have little
objection to allowing the amendment so long as the conciliation
proceedings are administered, especially in view of the court's
attitude that "the ends of justice will be better served by the
avoidance of two actions." 161
DRL § 215: Failure to file timely notice of commencenwnt of
divorce action with conciliation bureau held excusable.
CPLR 2004 provides that except where otherwise expressly
prescribed by law the court may "extend the time fixed by any
statute . . . for doing any act, upon such terms as may be just
and upon cause shown, whether the application for extension is
made before or after the expiration of the time fixed."
In Rodriguez v. Cowin,16 2 the court applied the above provision to a newly enacted section of the Domestic Relations Law,
215-c(a). This section provides that notice of the commencement
of a divorce action must be filed within ten days after its commencement with the conciliation bureau. In Rodriguez, a number
of circumstances, such as service having to be made outside the
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